University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2006

What Doth It Profit? Pelikan's Parallels
Steven D. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, Steven D., "What Doth It Profit? Pelikan's Parallels" (2006). Minnesota Law Review. 14.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

SMITH_3FMT

01/23/2006 04:28:27 PM

Review Essay

What Doth It Profit? Pelikan’s Parallels
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution. By Jaroslav
Pelikan, Yale University Press, 2004.

Reviewed by Steven D. Smith†
We have all read—or perhaps, alas, written—the kind of
book that serves up provocative or even extravagant claims but
offers little or no supporting evidence. But is the opposite also
possible? Might someone write a book that carefully and methodically marshals impressive evidence in support of . . . almost nothing? And if so, how should we evaluate such a book?
As useless, or worse—as a waste of the author’s valuable time,
and ours? Or as admirable—as the near perfect achievement of
an academic ideal of agenda-free scholarship? Or maybe on
some sort of evidence-to-claim-ratio criterion in which something close to zero in the second term will assure a very high
ratio indeed?
These are odd questions, probably, but they are provoked
by Jaroslav Pelikan’s book comparing biblical and constitutional interpretation.1 Such comparisons have been profitably
undertaken before by constitutional scholars,2 but it is safe to
say that no one with Pelikan’s formidable erudition in Christian doctrine and hermeneutics has ever attempted the task. It
is safe to say this because in all likelihood there is no one else
† Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I
thank Larry Alexander, Michael Perry, and Maimon Schwarzschild for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2004).
2. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9–53 (1988);
Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amendment, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447 (1996).
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with Pelikan’s erudition in these fields. Over a period of decades he has established himself as a proven and superb scholar,
and his unrivaled expertise fosters high hopes for this book. So,
what of interest or value emerges from his scholarly comparisons?
It’s hard to say. To be sure, Pelikan cautions us at the outset against false expectations. He concludes the first chapter by
noting that the book “is not intended as a direct intervention in
the fray of the current exegetical debates, whether biblical or
constitutional.”3 But he also expresses the hope that the book
“may be of some help and illumination also to those who stand
in the tradition of the two centuries of interpreting American
Scripture [i.e., the Constitution].”4 By the end of this learned
but puzzling and deeply frustrating book, though, it remains
far from clear just what “help and illumination” Pelikan has
provided. This review reflects on that question.
I. PELIKAN’S RICHLY IMPOVERISHED PRESENTATION
Pelikan’s book is composed of four chapters. The first chapter explains that both the Bible and the Constitution have
served as a “Great Code” or “Scripture” for a community—the
Christian community,5 the American Republic—that has
treated the text as normative and authoritative. The chapter
goes on to note a number of further parallels between biblical
and constitutional interpretation. Chapter two presents still
more parallels by discussing an array of common problems that
interpreters in each tradition have faced: ambiguities, apparently conflicting textual provisions, clashing absolutes, the
challenge of reconciling interpretations of an ancient text with
evolving views in the community, and the founding text’s silence about who should have final interpretive authority. Chapter three takes note of the conspicuous effort in each tradition
to discover and return to the text’s original meaning, and of the
obstacles that have confronted such efforts. The final chapter,
noting the fact of evolving interpretations in both the biblical
and constitutional traditions, discusses some of the criteria to

3. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 37.
4. Id.
5. Pelikan notes the possible relevance of comparisons to scriptural interpretation in the other major religions “of the book,” specifically Judaism
and Islam, but largely limits his presentation to the area of his own expertise
in Christian interpretation. Id. at 15–18.
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which interpreters and critics have appealed in order to distinguish “between benign and malignant growth”6 in doctrine.
In sum: Both the Bible and the Constitution have been regarded as authoritative texts; they have thus been subjected
over the decades and centuries to interpretation. Interpretation
(including efforts to ascertain original meaning) has encountered difficulties and has produced disagreements. Consequently, people in the biblical and constitutional traditions
have had to try to figure out how to distinguish between valid
and invalid interpretations.
Described in this way, Pelikan’s book may seem to be a deployment of massive learning for the purpose of informing us of
what we all knew before we picked up the book in the first
place. And in a sense that is what it does. So it is as if you went
to hear the world’s most celebrated astronomer and were
blessed with a lecture devoted to explaining that the stars are a
long, long way away, that they are most readily visible to the
naked eye in the nighttime, and that they are typically grouped
together in patterns known as “constellations.”
To be sure, this description fails to convey the richness of
the supporting material with which Pelikan develops and illustrates the book’s radically unprovocative claims. The observations about Christian hermeneutics are supported with citations to and illustrations from a multitude of sources and
examples: the Bible itself, the Church fathers, and a host of
creeds and confessions and pronouncements from the Orthodox,
Catholic, and Protestant traditions and from the remotest
reaches of Christian history up to the present. In case anyone
doubted Pelikan’s mastery of the Christian corpus, even this
small book should dispel any such doubts. The learning on the
constitutional side of the comparison is less awe-inspiring, not
surprisingly, but still respectable.
For some readers, this display of erudition may be enough
to make the book rewarding: who cares whether any interesting
or important insights emerge from the exercise? This same
quality may strike other readers as tiresome or pedantic. And
these more disgruntled readers might complain that the book
promises—or at least hints at—a larger payoff. I have already
noted Pelikan’s tentative proffer of “help and illumination.”7 In
addition, Pelikan suggests at the outset that he will be con6. Id. at 135.
7. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
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cerned with “the proper methods for interpreting” biblical and
constitutional texts.8 The remark might lead us to anticipate
more reflection or analysis regarding what sort of interpretive
methods are or are not “proper” or legitimate.
But by the end of the first chapter, the “proper” has already dropped out, and the book’s purpose has been framed in
purely descriptive terms. “In one sense, therefore, the question
of this book is very narrow: What are the means and methods
by which official interpreters read their normative texts?”9 The
remainder of the book hews to that more modest agenda. It is
for the most part descriptive, nonevaluative, and nonjudgmental. Pelikan hints at some of his own hermeneutical judgments,
but he does not really declare them, much less explain and defend them.10
Even the final chapter on development of doctrine offers
little to those who might actually be interested in the question
of whether particular developments in doctrine are permissible
interpretations of, as opposed to impositions on, the text. Here
Pelikan reviews the seven criteria proposed by John Henry
Newman for assessing such developments, but these criteria
are more in the nature of highly conclusory statements of what
to think about (or to argue about)11 than of rules or guidelines
that could help resolve such arguments. For example, Newman’s second criterion (continuity of principles) will already be
entirely familiar to constitutional interpreters—who will also
8. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 36.
10. Pelikan does show that the quest for original meaning encounters obstacles. But he does not explicitly conclude that these obstacles invalidate or
discredit the idea that original meaning should be the touchstone for interpretation, and he does not infer from the difficulties that the object of interpretation should be something more like contemporary meaning (whatever that is).
Nor should he. Such reasoning, though common enough, would be a non sequitur: if there are good reasons for treating original meaning as authoritative (a
contested point, obviously), the difficulty of ascertaining that meaning should
not be a sufficient reason for adopting an essentially different approach to interpretation. Imagine the police detective who announces, “I started out with
the intention to discover and arrest the person who actually committed the
crime, but since the evidence has turned out to be inadequate and inconclusive, I have had to alter my objective: my goal now is to arrest the person that
the public today would most like to see in jail.”
11. Newman’s criteria for assessing interpretations include “preservation
of its type; continuity of its principles; its power of assimilation; its logical sequence; anticipation of its future; conservative action upon its past; [and] its
chronic vigor.” PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 124 (discussing Newman’s tests and
the revision of those tests in his later work).
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understand what asserting this criterion can and, more importantly, cannot do. That is, they will understand that for any
live constitutional dispute—affirmative action, same-sex marriage, federalism—it is of little help to declare that we should
adopt an interpretation that is continuous with principles discernible in the text and in past decisions. We already knew
that—took it for granted, probably—and the dispute will be
about which among the clashing interpretations best succeeds
in maintaining such continuity.
At times Pelikan comes close to acknowledging that the
development criteria are of little use on the level of actual application. Thus, he observes that although Newman initially
held out his seven criteria as “tests,” he later and more modestly redescribed them as “notes” or “tokens.”12 And Pelikan
points out instances in Christian history—debates over the use
of icons and images that divided Eastern Christians in the
eighth and ninth centuries and later split Catholics and Protestants13 and the Filioque debate14 that was central to the rupture between Western and Eastern Orthodox Christianity—in
which the same criteria later articulated by Newman were
claimed and cited by contending parties on both sides of the issues (just as they are routinely enlisted by opposing sides in
American constitutional debates).
In sum, it seems that Pelikan has provided us with a
wealth of data, expertly retrieved and organized, but precious
little “illumination.” So the margins in my copy of his work are
filled with “And so . . . ?” and “Where is this going?” The learning is impressive. But what’s the point?
Perhaps this reaction is unfair. After all, what sort of illumination might we reasonably expect to issue from this sort of
comparison? Are there interesting questions on which we might
reasonably expect Pelikan’s undertaking to shed some light?

12. Id. (citing to JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE
OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 206 (2d ed. 1989) (1878)).

DEVELOPMENT

13. Id. at 139. For more detailed accounts of these controversies, see CARLOS M.N. EIRE, WAR AGAINST THE IDOLS: THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP
FROM ERASMUS TO CALVIN (1986); 2 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 91–145 (1974).
14. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 143. The disagreement was over a question

that, although perhaps alien to most modern sensibilities, was fiercely disputed in centuries past: should the Holy Spirit be said to proceed from the Father alone or from the Father and the Son? For a more detailed account, see
PELIKAN, supra note 13, at 183–98.
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II. VITAL QUESTIONS
Well, . . . yes. Of course, no book would be able to address
all of the questions it touches on; we are satisfied if a book advances our understanding of some of the issues it raises. Nonetheless, there are questions that Pelikan’s discussion might
naturally lead us to ask—and to expect from him some notice
and comment.
For example, there are what we might call explanatory
questions. The recognition of similarities—in persons, practices, cultures—often provokes such questions. Suppose we observe, say, similar religious practices in ancient Greece and ancient Crete, or in ancient Egypt and pre-Columbian America.
Or we notice similar ideas and phrases in, say, a European poet
and an American playwright. Such observations will immediately provoke a desire for an explanation. Are the similarities
mere coincidence? Or is there a causal connection—some sort of
historical influence, for example?15 If so, which way did it run?
Who influenced whom? And how did this influence occur? Perhaps the similarities are neither coincidental nor the result of
actual historical influence; maybe they reflect the common logical outcome of some feature or function common to both of the
things being compared, or the natural and hence parallel response to some common question or challenge. Or maybe humans are just hard-wired to behave in this way?
Perceived similarities typically and naturally prompt us to
wonder about such questions.16 In short, in a world in which
much is random, unexpected similarities call out for some sort
of explanation.

15. Legal historians, for example, routinely debate such questions. Cf.
S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (2003) (noting
that “the influence of Roman law upon English law . . . has been a perennial
topic among English legal historians”).
16. Both Christian and constitutional scholarship is filled with such discussions. Scholars of Christianity debate, for example, what influences affected the writing of the various early Gospels and what influence they had on
each other. Was the Gospel of Mark written first, and did the authors of the
other Gospels draw on it as a source? And so forth. See, e.g., GRAHAM N.
STANTON, THE GOSPELS AND JESUS 34–138 (1989) (offering an in-depth examination of the Four Gospels). Scholars of the early American Republic debate the influence of various thinkers and sources—such as Locke, Montesquieu, the Bible, early writers in the classical republican tradition, and Greek
and Roman authors—on the Founders and the Constitution. See, e.g., VITAL
REMNANTS: AMERICA’S FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN TRADITION (Gary L.
Gregg II ed., 1999). These debates by now virtually could fill libraries.
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A different kind of question frequently provoked by the observation of similarities—and a question that may be underscored by proffered explanations of such similarities—concerns
what we might call efficacy, or perhaps justification. Suppose
we observe that legal systems in the High Middle Ages employed some of the same techniques of legal reasoning that had
been used centuries earlier in Roman law. And suppose further
that we plausibly explain these similarities by identifying historical influences: legal scholars in Bologna rediscovered some
older Roman texts, for example.17 The observation and explanation may well prompt us to ask whether these techniques, native to the Roman world, were equally compatible with medieval needs and assumptions. Was this a fruitful importation or
an incongruous and perhaps unsettling one?18
These are questions that one might expect Pelikan’s study
to lead him to address. How do we explain the similarities between Christian and constitutional interpretation? Have constitutional interpreters consciously or unconsciously copied the
hermeneutical techniques that Christian exegetes had been developing in previous centuries? Or have interpreters in the different traditions independently arrived at the same kinds of
questions and techniques? If so, how do we explain such parallels? And are interpretive techniques that grow out of Christian
assumptions about scripture and the world equally efficacious
or justified in the ostensibly more secular enterprise of constitutional interpretation?
The mass of hermeneutical similarities that Pelikan surveys virtually thrust such questions upon us. And yet, somehow, Pelikan deftly avoids noticing them. Nor does he dwell on
the subtler questions that we might think of as existential.19
What sort of creatures are we, such that we evidently are
17. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
MATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).

REVOLUTION: THE FOR-

18. Christians have long debated such questions in considering, for example, the relations between the earliest Christian teachings, growing out of the
Jewish world, and the Greek thought into which Christian ideas were soon
translated and from which Christian doctrines and formulations were borrowed. Did Greek philosophy corrupt Christianity or, conversely, allow for the
happy, faithful development of truths that had merely been implicit in the earliest Christian thought? See, e.g., 1 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 11–55 (1971); WILLIAM C. PLACHER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 55–
67 (1983).
19. Perhaps the seminal modern reflection on such questions is HANSGEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (2d rev. ed. 1999).
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driven by some sort of need to be always “interpreting”? After
all, it is conceivable that we could live our lives in a more forward-looking and pragmatic way, making decisions mostly on
the basis of calculations about what choices will produce favorable consequences. There are those who point out the obvious
good sense in this pragmatic approach.20 And yet it seems that
whether as religious believers or as citizens of a constitutional
republic, on many of the most crucial matters we do something
entirely different and arguably quite bizarre: we purport to
make our most momentous decisions based on what some ancient text is thought obscurely to command. Why do we do this?
How does this practice—this obsessive deference to a sometimes virtually inscrutable past—make sense?
And then there are what we might call presuppositional
questions. How, or on what presuppositions, is “interpretation”
even possible? We say of some nebulous passage in an old text,
such as Jesus’ more esoteric parables or the Fourteenth
Amendment: “The people who wrote these words never consciously imagined that they meant X, and the unacculturated
reader today probably would be surprised to learn that they
mean X; nonetheless, through careful and conscientious ‘interpretation,’ we now affirm that the passage means X. We’re not
just imposing our ideas on the text: like it or not, that’s what it
really means.”21 We say these sorts of things all the time in religion and in law: Christians say such things with respect to
Trinitarian, Christological, and eschatological doctrines; and
constitutionalists say them with respect to the right to abortion
and the doctrine against sex discrimination. But how is this exercise possible and on what presuppositions? What could it
even mean to say that the text actually means X even if the authors did not intend this and the average reader would never
guess it?

20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LE(1999); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
21. Describing classical practices of interpreting Hebrew scripture, James
Kugel observes that interpreters treated the text as “fundamentally cryptic or
esoteric.” JAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS 18 (1997). Thus, “all interpreters are fond of maintaining that although Scripture may appear to be saying X, what it really means is Y, or that while Y is not openly said by Scripture, it is somehow implied or hinted at in X.” Id. But Kugel notices the oddity
of this practice: “it is hardly a natural thing . . . . Whether we are reading a
history book or a newspaper editorial or a rousing hymn, we generally assume
that what the words seem to say is what they mean to say.” Id.

GAL THEORY
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It might well be that Christian interpreters could give different answers to these questions than constitutional interpreters could—and more plausible answers, at least on their
own premises. If you believe that in some sense the real author
of a sacred text was not the human scribe who penned the
words but rather God, then it is not so odd to suppose that the
text might contain deeper meanings not apparent to the casually uninspired reader or even to the historical and human “author.”22 This has indeed been the assumption underlying much
Christian biblical interpretation. Pelikan notes this point in
passing but declines to explore its implications.23 Conversely,
without the assumption of more than human authorship, the
search for hidden, unanticipated meanings seems much more
curious.24
It is natural to raise such questions—natural and potentially profitable. Reflecting on them may help us achieve a
deeper understanding of the similarities we initially noticed.
And reflection may lift those similarities above the level of raw
data and help to deepen our understanding not only of the specific subject we set out to study, but sometimes even of the human situation, or the cosmos, or whatever it is that drives
scholars and students to want to spend their lives studying
things like history or hermeneutics in the first place.
In sum, the pervasiveness of interpretation provides material for extensive reflection25—the more so, one might think,
when we see the same interpretive patterns emerging in apparently independent enterprises with different goals and presuppositions. Indeed, Pelikan starts off his comparisons with a
nicely crafted statement that not only serves to introduce the
similarities between Christian and constitutional interpretation, but that also seems well calculated to provoke the very

22. Indeed, you might believe, as Aquinas explained, that God is the “author” not only of the words contained in scripture but of the events themselves
narrated in those words; that assumption would provide a further basis for
finding deeper meanings in the text. See WERNER G. JEANROND, THEOLOGICAL
HERMENEUTICS: DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE 28–29 (1991).
23. E.g., PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 105.
24. I have discussed this incongruity at length elsewhere. See Steven D.
Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583 (1993);
Steven D. Smith, Law as a Religious Enterprise: Legal Interpretation and
Scriptural Interpretation, in 4 LAW AND RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
2001, at 83 (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001).
25. For an outstanding example that focuses on law, see JOSEPH VINING,
FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP (1995).
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kinds of existential and presuppositional questions that I have
just noticed—the questions of “What are we?” and “What for?”
and “How is this possible?”
There is a familiar and venerable text, centuries old by now, which is
the product of multiple authorship (although even after generations of
historical research and literary analysis we are not always in a position to determine with absolute precision just who wrote, or rewrote,
which parts of it). The text was originally composed under very specific circumstances, which modern historical scholarship has done
much to illumine. But far transcending the history of its original
composition is its official standing ever since, for it has been adopted
by a community as its normative Great Code, and therefore as occupying a position that in some profound sense stands beyond its own
history: in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s fighting words of 1838, “not spake
but speaketh!” That normative status is based on the assumption that
it can be applied to any and all of the radically changed situations of
later times, many of which the writers who originally framed it could
not themselves conceivably have foreseen. Every official action of the
community thus has had the obligation of conforming to it, or any
rate of not violating it, and of demonstrating that conformity when
challenged to do so; and members of the community are under the
strictest possible obligation to obey it. Therefore its words and
phrases have for centuries called forth meticulous and sophisticated—
and sometimes painfully convoluted—interpretation, as well as continual reinterpretation. By now, this interpretation has grown into a
massive corpus of authoritative, if often controversial, commentary.
Yet the text does not itself prescribe the method of such interpretation; nor does it specifically identify the authoritative agency that
bears the ultimate responsibility for determining the binding interpretation, much less for revising it.26

Pelikan observes, plausibly enough, that both the Bible
and the Constitution fit this description of a “familiar and venerable text,”27 and he proceeds with his presentation of the
similarities between biblical and constitutional interpretation.
He does not remark on the evident strangeness of what he has
just described. Yet, the passage sketches a practice that, except
to those so immersed in it that the deeper questions disappear
from view, cries out for some sort of explanatory or justifying
account. In this respect, it seems like descriptions of, say, older
forms of trial by fire or water (convicting or acquitting someone
of a crime by seeing whether they float when thrown into the
pond) or augury (deciding whether to go to war by purporting to
read the entrails of birds).28 “What sort of people were these?”
26. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 4–5.
27. Id. at 6–7.
28. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
4–7 (3d ed. 1990) (explaining the procedure and methods of proof associated
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we inevitably ask. “What could they have been thinking? On
what assumptions could these practices have made sense?”
Pelikan has surely reflected on such questions, but he
seems coy about sharing his reflections with us. There is irony
here. “What does this mean?” (or perhaps “What does this mean
for us?”) is the hermeneutical question, but while Pelikan diligently describes the ways in which other people have pursued
that question in their own fields, he seems unwilling to pose
the question for his own materials and project. One who did not
know better might almost suppose that he is afflicted with a
severe lack of curiosity, like a diligent but dull student who can
dutifully line up the columns in response to a “compare and
contrast” question on an exam without ever wondering why the
comparison might be worth making.
And yet, this analogy cannot be apt. A lack of curiosity
does not lead someone to devote decades of his life to acquiring
a vast knowledge of a subject that carries no obvious or immediate practical payoff. Far from being a dull student, Pelikan is
a scholarly paragon, and in other work on Christian doctrine
that does not cross disciplinary lines, Pelikan does pay more attention to some of the presuppositional questions noted here.29
So it seems there must be some other explanation for his
reticence in this book. What might it be? I have already noted,
more than once, that Pelikan is an exemplary scholar. Might
his very scholarly excellence help account for what comes
across as a disappointing lack of curiosity? The question calls
for some observations about the academic environment in
which Pelikan has lived his scholarly life.
III. THE CONTAINMENT STRATEGY
We understand in particular social settings, if we have
been properly raised, that there are certain questions that irresistibly flit through our minds but that we must refrain from
voicing. (“How much weight have you gained since I saw you
last year?” “How long did you say you’d been married, Aunt
Prudence, when you had your first baby?”) The same is true of
scholarly settings; the ethos or etiquette of various disciplines
may frown on particular inquiries that the uninitiated might
with trial by ordeal, as well as its intellectual presuppositions).
29. See, e.g., JAROSLAV PELIKAN, CREDO: HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
GUIDE TO CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION
142–57 (2003).
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regard as obvious and important. Indeed, in an era of unparalleled academic freedom, modern scholarship often exhibits a
remarkable timidity with respect to fundamental and obvious
questions.
Suppose, for example, that you are a professional historian
writing about some controversial religious figure, like Mohammed or Joseph Smith, or about a controversial religion, such as
Islam or Mormonism. The layperson might naturally think that
the most urgent questions to address, and if possible to answer,
would be questions of truth. Did these figures, accepted by
some as prophets, in fact experience the revelations they
claimed to have received? And are the religions they founded
actually true? At one remove, the layperson might be interested
in questions of coherence or integrity. Are the belief systems
associated with these religions harmonious and internally consistent? Or about value: do these religions promote a good way
of life? Aren’t these the obvious questions and the questions
that prompt human beings to care about such subjects in the
first place?
As a respectable scholar with a university job, though, you
may feel constrained to steer around these kinds of vital questions, if indeed it even occurred to you to ask them at all. Such
constraints may arise from a variety of rationales or concerns.
Some are basically, or at least initially, epistemic. History is
not a hard science, perhaps, but it has absorbed some of the
scientific aspiration to stick to what is knowable or verifiable
with the use of largely empirical methods. These epistemic constraints may harden into more fundamental philosophical
commitments—into the naturalistic assumption, for example,
that what cannot be observed empirically is not real. So the
misguided historian who innocently tries to decide whether the
prophet really saw angels has not merely passed beyond what
is knowable; he has lapsed into silliness, into “metaphysical
nonsense.”
Even scholars who do not hold this reductionist worldview,
however, may refrain from pressing hard questions for reasons
that are diplomatic or political or perhaps ethical. After all, in
writing about Mohammed or Joseph Smith, or Islam or Mormonism, you could hardly take a stand on questions of religious
truth or value without alienating a large section of your audience. And if questions of truth or integrity or value are raised
and treated as real questions, then there is the possibility that
the answer might turn out to be in the negative. Some people—
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and not just the adherents of the belief systems in questions—
might find that sort of conclusion to be insufficiently respectful.
And yet controversial claims of truth or value may be absolutely central to the subject that the scholar has set out to
study. So how to avoid passing judgment on such claims? A familiar response, common in history and the social sciences, employs what we can call the self-contained subject strategy or,
for short, the containment strategy. A scholar may thus stake
out what the subject of study is and then limit his or her investigations to questions that seem “internal” to the subject. The
scholar conscientiously declines to pursue other questions that
are regarded as more “external” to the subject, and questions of
ultimate truth or value can be shunted into this external category.
Using this strategy, you, as a professional historian, might
simply describe what some person or movement of persons said
or believed. Or perhaps you explore some of the connections
among and the implications of such beliefs, while delicately
omitting to speak to the question of whether the beliefs are true
or justified in any more ultimate sense. Those are questions of
theology, you might say, or perhaps, of philosophy; at any rate,
they are outside your jurisdiction. Joseph Smith said an angel
appeared to him and showed him some gold plates, and his followers believed this. These things you might say with confidence, and so there is no need for you, as a historian, to pass
judgment on whether these beliefs were true. Using this deferential approach, you might limit your study to questions subject to empirical inquiry, and you might respectfully address
both believers and nonbelievers without insulting or offending
them.30
The self-contained subject approach is hardly confined to
history or anthropology. In more theoretical disciplines such as
30. My tentative view is that although this approach is both common and
appealing, and indeed may seem to be the only alternative open to the secular
historian, it ultimately does not work. Even the secular historian uninterested
in deeper questions of religious truth will still need to try to understand the
character of the figures she studies. Was the self-proclaimed prophet honest,
cleverly fraudulent, or delusional? But these questions of character cannot be
neatly separated from the truth of the claims made. In addition, the historian
will eventually try not merely to report what happened but to offer explanations of what happened. However, religious explanations (“It happened because God so ordained” or “He did it because God told him to”) and secular explanations (economic, political, and so forth) are likely to diverge, and the
plausibility of these explanations cannot be divorced from the question of the
truth of the religious claims.
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ethics, religion, and legal theory, variations on the same strategy are subtly or conspicuously adopted for some of the same
reasons, and perhaps for a deeper reason as well—one that we
might describe as “fear of nihilism.”
Thus, in these disciplines, there is the same scienceinspired desire to stay within the realm of what humans can
confidently know. Hence the aversion of many philosophers to
old-style metaphysical speculation, in favor of the close scrutinizing of language and the detailed analysis of carefully delimited concepts. There may be the same censoriously naturalistic
worldview lurking in the background and shaping what the
academy regards as acceptable and unacceptable scholarship.
Scholars may also be driven by the same desire to treat their
subject matter—and their scholarly interlocutors and audience—with respect, and thus not to challenge or undermine
anyone’s most cherished or constitutive beliefs.
But beyond these concerns, scholars may be afflicted by the
premonition that if they press too hard, if they ask the larger
questions about ultimate truth or justification or value, they
are likely to discover that the practices we are interested in—
and also, more importantly, personally engaged in and committed to—are grounded in . . . nothing. One way to avoid this risk
is to banish the deeper questions. We might do this by treating
some discursive practice, such as religion, ethics, or law, as
self-contained and elemental—as itself the proper and sufficient object of study and reflection—without bluntly asking
whether its assumptions are correct representations of anything outside the practice or discourse.
Thus, Norman Malcolm proposes just this strategy for protecting religion against skeptical assaults. Religion is a “language-game” and “a form of life; it is language embedded in action.”31 Hence, it does not depend on the existence of any
independent being who is God.32 The same strategy is apparent
in a good deal of modern metaethical writing. A recurring concern, sometimes described as Nietzschean, worries that by denying the existence of transcendence or of any built-in purpose
in the cosmos, modern naturalistic worldviews have cut the

31. Norman Malcolm, The Groundlessness of Belief, in FAITH 193, 203
(Terence Penelhum ed., 1989).
32. Id. (calling the “notion of belief in the existence of God which is
thought to be distinct from belief in God . . . an artificial construction of philosophy”).
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ground out from under our ethical beliefs and commitments.33
In some thinkers, this diagnosis can lead to a kind of dark desperation.34 One tempting response to this concern is simply to
conflate morality with moral discourse and practice. It can
hardly be denied, after all, that we talk about ethical questions
and announce ethical judgments. Whatever doubts some may
have about ethics, ethical discourse is certainly real. So philosophers can occupy themselves in studying the intricate
workings of this discourse, considering questions internal to the
discourse and treating more external questions as inadmissible,
thereby deflecting fears of ethical nihilism. To the old-fashioned
(or perhaps the hard-headed) this strategy may seem like a
kind of evasion,35 but its appeal is readily understandable.
In law, besieged in modern times by varieties of skepticism, “legal realism,” and critical subversion, this strategic response may be inviting. Thus, the self-contained subject approach is boldly embraced and advocated in the theorizing of
Dennis Patterson36 and Philip Bobbitt,37 for whom legal discourse is its own world with its own internal truth, so to speak,
and is not representative of anything outside itself. “[L]egal
propositions are not propositions about the world,” Patterson
declares.38 “[L]aw is a practice of argument.”39 “There is only
the practice and nothing more.”40
33. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(2d ed. 1984) (offering a powerful and much-discussed argument to this effect);
see also RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001).
34. For two expressions of this attitude, one from a philosopher and the
other from a law professor, see W.T. STACE, MAN AGAINST DARKNESS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 10 (1967) and Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229 (1979).
35. See JOHN M. RIST, REAL ETHICS: RECONSIDERING THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MORALITY (2002). Rist contends that in fact there are only two coherent
metaethical positions—a metaphysical moral realism that most modern theorists eschew, and nihilism. Id. at 38–44. “[A]ll other possibilities [are] goodnatured muddles to be collapsed by the clear-headed into Thrasymacheanism.”
Id. at 44. Positions that purport to be neither objectivist nor nihilist are maintained only through “deception and self-deception (including outright lying).”
Id. at 37; see also ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION
49–50 (1992).
36. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996).
37. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982).
38. PATTERSON, supra note 36, at 135 (explaining Bobbitt’s view).
39. Id. at 181.
40. Id. at 142. I discuss and criticize this view in STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S
QUANDARY 70–74 (2004).
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A more central and influential instance in law, although a
complicated one that I cannot elaborate on here, is found in
H.L.A. Hart’s self-enclosing explanation of legal authority. It
asserts, basically, that the “rule of recognition” on which a system of law depends is authoritative if and because legal officials regard it as authoritative.41 A similar containment strategy is discernible, arguably, in the efforts of Hart’s long-time
academic antagonist, Ronald Dworkin, to defeat skeptical challenges to law and morality. In essence, Dworkin divides skeptical claims into “internal” and “external” varieties; he then tries
to deflect or deconstruct the “external” claims, so that the important or viable challenges are necessarily “internal” in nature.42 But it is the nature of internal claims that they assume
or accept the very legal or moral discourse that they seemed to
challenge, so that discourse becomes insulated against the most
serious and sweeping challenges by being elevated into a selfcontained system.
In sum, for an array of reasons epistemic, political, and
ethical, and sometimes as a defense against fears of nihilism or
emptiness, modern scholars often adopt the strategy of treating
some movement, discourse, or practice as self-grounding, selfvalidating, or sufficient unto itself. This strategy operates to
dismiss, as pointless or inapt, questions about deeper meaning,
truth, or justification. Many of the inquiries that we might
naturally be tempted to make are thus ruled out of order. What
is the point of wondering about the truth of a discourse that
constitutes its own truth? And why ask whether there is any
justification for a practice that is self-justifying? In this vein,
Patterson approvingly summarizes Philip Bobbitt’s view of constitutional law: “The key is to see that the practice of judicial
review—or, more broadly, constitutional law—requires no justification . . . . Law is not a theory: it is a practice . . . .”43 Conse41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–17 (2d ed. 1994). Perhaps
not coincidentally, Pelikan quietly assumes a somewhat similar premise in accounting for the authority of Christian and American Scripture. He suggests
that the Bible and the Constitution are authoritative because Christian and
constitutional communities accept them as such. See PELIKAN, supra note 1, at
8, 22. Of course, the members of those religious and constitutional communities might object that this characterization gets things exactly backwards: the
texts are not authoritative because they are accepted, but rather are accepted
because they are authoritative.
42. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 76–85 (1986); Ronald Dworkin,
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
I thank Larry Alexander for pointing out this feature of Dworkin’s theorizing.
43. PATTERSON, supra note 36, at 136 (referring to Philip Bobbitt’s views
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quently, “there simply is nothing more for ‘philosophy’ to do
than describe accurately the practice of constitutional argument, for that practice is constitutional law.”44
This last assertion provides the perfect segue back to Pelikan’s own treatment of constitutional interpretation. In this
view, my disappointment with Pelikan’s book for being merely
learnedly descriptive while failing to reflect on the interesting
attendant questions would be unfair and profoundly misguided.
That is, if “there is nothing more for ‘philosophy’ to do than describe accurately the practice of constitutional argument,” then
it may be that Pelikan has done the only thing that sensibly
can be done. “This is what constitutional interpreters do,” the
sage explains. “Maybe so,” the naive critic concedes, “but why?
It all seems so strange. How does this practice make sense?”
“Those questions are misconceived,” the sage gravely replies. “I
have told you what constitutional interpreters do. That is all
that need be said—all that can be said.”
Indeed, it seems that Pelikan’s approach is wholly consistent with the containment strategy evident in so much modern
scholarship; his book is virtually a paradigm case. Exactly what
motivates his resort to that strategy is something that I cannot—and perhaps even he could not—know with any certainty.
But it seems plausible to suppose that Pelikan may have
adopted that strategy for the same kinds of reasons we have
noticed already. There is security in merely describing what
constitutional and biblical interpreters have done. To go further
and theorize about why they have done these things, or about
whether their practices are justified, would be epistemically
risky and there would be a real risk of giving offense. It might
turn out, for example, that hermeneutical techniques that
make sense on Christian assumptions—about God being the
real author of scripture or about the Holy Spirit operating in a
developing Christian tradition—make no sense at all on the
secular assumptions that govern the constitutional enterprise.45
That conclusion might not merely offend; it might be subversive, suggesting, for example, that a good deal of what the
modern Supreme Court says as it goes about striking down
as expressed in his work, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37).
44. Id. at 136 n.39.
45. For a discussion of the development and use of hermeneutical techniques in theology, see generally JEANROND, supra note 22.

SMITH_3FMT

744

01/23/2006 04:28:27 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:727

laws, traditional institutions, and practices is a sort of irrational idolatry disguising an elitist exercise of power. But by
now we take the Court’s behavior for granted; in some sense,
we may even depend upon it. Our world would be upset if that
practice were shown to be irrational or, as we say, “illegitimate.” So it is understandable that an eminent and respected
scholar—a Yale man, no less—would be loathe to go down a
road that just might culminate in such distressing conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Jaroslav Pelikan has given us a characteristically erudite
book. But readers may be pardoned for regretting that while
surveying the hermeneutical methods that Christians and constitutionalists have adopted, Pelikan has refrained from posing
the hermeneutical question—what does this mean?—with respect to the numerous parallels he presents.
I have suggested in this Review that what might appear to
be a remarkable failure of curiosity is better explained as the
application of a containment strategy familiar in much modern
scholarship. Although the appeal of that strategy is understandable, the approach is also a costly one. It aims to provide a
modest but epistemically secure understanding of a given practice. But since the practitioners themselves—the religious believers, the people who engage in moral discourse, and the
Christian and constitutional interpreters—do not typically understand their practice as self-contained and self-sufficient, the
strategy risks providing a systematically skewed account of its
subject matter. The self-contained subject strategy is especially
problematic with respect to the “compare and contrast” sort of
study that Pelikan is engaged in here, because if the practices
are actually self-contained, it becomes unclear how they can intelligibly or profitably be compared.
Perhaps most importantly, as this Review has discussed at
length, the containment strategy may prevent an eminent
scholar from addressing (and from sharing his wisdom concerning) some of the most important questions that likely motivated
both the scholar and the readers to take an interest in the subject in the first place. So the reaction may be one that attends
some of the most impressive modern scholarship: “A remarkable achievement. Oh, and by the way, . . . why should anyone
care?”

